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The Digital Threat to the
Normative Role of Copyright Law
SHELDON W. HALPERIN*
Current digital technology has radically enhanced the ability to create digital
images of copyrighted works and to replicate, manipulate, modify, and transmit and
distribute such images on a massive scale. The intellectual property legal structure,
particularly the United States copyright laws, while purporting to contemplate and
embrace technological change and advance, in fact cannot adequately deal with
current technological reality. The ease with which a variety of acts of large-scale
copyright infingement can take place, and the frequency ofsuch activity, call into
question whether present copyright law can effectively serve a normativefunction.
The article attempts to examine the role of law in this context.
The revolution in information technology is changing access to information in
fundamental ways. Increasing amounts of information are available in digital form.
Networks interconnect computers around the globe; and the World Wide Web provides
a framework for access to a vast array of information, from favorite family recipes and
newspaper articles to scholarly treatises and music, all available at the click of a mouse.
Yet the same technologies that provide vastly enhanced access also raise difficult
fundamental issues concerning intellectual property, because the technology that makes
access so easy also greatly aids copying-both legal and illegal. As a result, many of the
intellectual property rules and practices that evolved in the world ofphysical artifacts do
not work well in the digital environment1I
I. INTRODUCTION: PIRATE STORIES
A recent newspaper story2 was devoted to the activities of CD "pirates"--
individuals who copy commercial CDs containing copyrighted music onto blank
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
1 COMM. ON INTEu. PROP. RIGHTs AND THE EMERGING INFO. INFRASTRUCrURE, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCL, THE DIGrrALDILEMMA: INT ECruAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE,
at ix (2000) [hereinafter DIGrTAL DILEMMA]. The executive summmy of The Digital Dilemma is
reprinted in this issue. 62 OHIO ST. L.. 951 (2001).
2 Brian E. Zittel, The Pirates ofPop Music Fill Streets With $5 CD's, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
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CDs,3 which are then sold on street comers to passersby, many of whom are regular
customers. The sellers, by copying the CDs and distributing the copies, clearly have
infringed the rights of the copyright owners of the music contained in the CDs (the
composers, authors, and publishers of the works) and the copyright owners of the
sound recordings embodied in the CDs (the producers of the recordings). There is no
mystery or subtlety here, or close question of law: the Copyright Act is unequivocal
in vesting in these respective copyright owners the exclusive right to make such
copies and to distribute them.4 Moreover, while there may well be some public
confusion with respect to the legality of noncommercial copying,5 there is no reason
to believe that similar confusion exists with respect to blatantly commercial copying
and distribution. Both the sellers and buyers know that they are dealing in unlawfully
created commodities. Nevertheless, when a customer was asked why he regularly
patronizes one of these street comer vendors he replied: "Everybody buys from [him].
The quality is very good. He's reputable and he's honest.' 6
According to another story in the New York Times "about a million otherwise
law-abiding adult citizens are demonstrating no compunction about using the service
[of Napster, an Internet service linking computers to exchange copyrighted music
among unrelated individuals] to get free what they would have to pay for in a record
store.'7 As one potential investor in the service put it, "IfI believe the new model [of
music distribution] is a better way for artists to operate, that is a moral justification for
feeling good about investing in Napster... even though technically what they're
doing is facilitating illegal behavior."8 One user of the service framed the moral issue
succinctly: "But how illegal is it, really?... Is it illegal if you go three miles over the
speed limit?... So yeah, you're breaking the law, but how big a law is it?" 9
These simple interchanges demonstrate a sharp dissonance between the law as
perceived by the public and the moral impact of the law on conduct.' 0 Of course,
1999, at El.
3 "Music 'pirates' use digital recording technology to make and to distribute near perfect
copies of commercially prepared recordings for which they have not licensed the copyrights"
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073 (9th Cir.
1999).
4 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
5 See infra Part lA.
6 Zittel, supra note 2.
7 Amy Harmon, Potent Software Escalates Music Industry's Jitters, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 7,
2000, at Al.
8Id.
91 d
10 As a member of the music industry observed: 'There's an incredible disconnect out there
between what is normal behavior in the physical world versus the online world .... There are
people who think nothing of downloading entire CD collections on Napster who wouldn't dream
of shoplifting from Tower Records."' Id
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such dissonance, to one degree or another, has long been part of society and societal
response to specific laws.II Concomitantly, complex legislation such as the law of
copyright, can easily give rise to a fair amount of misunderstanding. For example,
notwithstanding the fact that the Copyright Act in general does not exculpate
"private" copying, "widespread (and incorrect) belief prevails in society that private
use copying is always or almost always lawful." 12 So too, people generally are
surprised to learn that singing Happy Birthday in a public restaurant is an infinging
act But the dissonance that goes beyond such misunderstanding is quite different in
that it revolves around an active disregard for the law. Such disregard has always
existed to some extent as individuals, with a wink and a nod, make copies of rented
videotapes or of borrowed computer software. The problem, however, has potentiated
with the growth of digital technology. Although the CD started to replace vinyl
records about fifteen years ago, it is only quite recently that the technology for making
virtually perfect copies of a CD became widely available at an affordable price. The
general availability of expert-level tools for manipulating digital images similarly is
a recent phenomenon. Digital video, digital sound, and digital imaging provide the
wherewithal both for extraordinary creativity with respect to the creation of works of
the mind and for incredibly easy reproduction, manipulation, and distribution of such
works. Adding the Intemet to the mix as a digital distribution tool providing virtually
instantaneous access to millions of users serves to make the problem one of huge
universal dimensions. As the newly released National Research Council report-The
Digital Dilemma--observes:
The information infrastructure-by which we mean information in digital form,
computer networks, and the World Wide Web-has arrived accompanied by
contradictory powers and promises .... It is at once a remarkably powerful medium for
publishing and distributing information, and the world's largest reproduction facility.
Information in digital form has radically changed the economics and ease of
reproduction. Reproduction costs are much lower for both rights holders (content
owners) and inflingers alike. Digital copies are also perfect replicas, each a seed for
further perfect copies. One consequence is an erosion of what were once the natural
barriers to infringement, such as the expense of reproduction and the decreasing quality
of successive generations of copies in analog media .... Computer networks have
radically changed the economics of distribution. With transmission speeds approaching
a billion characters per second, networks enable sending information products
worldwide, cheaply and almost instantaneously. As a consequence, it is easier and less
expensive both for a rights holder to distribute a work and for individuals or pirates to
make and distribute unauthorized copies.
11The American experience with Prohibition is the most glaring example.
12 DIGrrADnEMMA, supra note 1, at 214.
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Today, some actions that can be taken casually by the average citizen-
downloading files, forwarding information found on the Web--can at times be blatant
violations of intellectual property laws.13
In the past, it took some effort to make infringing copies of copyrighted works
or to create unauthorized derivative works. It took even greater effort, and expense,
widely to distribute such copies or works. The efforts, and particularly the time
involved, created a framework in which the individual might pause to consider the
implications of his or her conduct and balance moral imperative and expediency. The
proliferation of home computers, with the capability of easily copying material,
created a breach in this framework Now, as we have moved to a "digital" paradigm
and a World Wide Web of vast interconnectivity, the framework is largely gone: "The
information infirastructure makes private infringement of [intellectual property] rights
vastly easier to carry out and correspondingly more difficult to detect and prevent As
a result, individual standards of moral and ethical conduct, and individual perceptions
of right and wrong, become more important.' 14
Individual determinations of moral and ethical conduct require a moral and
ethical context The problem for intellectual property law in general, and the law of
copyright in particular, is the lack of such an underlying clear context The nature of
American copyright law makes it difficult, if not impossible to find or to construct an
unambiguous moral compass.
II. THE INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS OF A LAW FOUNDED ON COMPROMISE
Our copyright law arises out of a grand compromise, reconciling the need to
encourage the creative process by protecting the interests of authors, and the public
need for access to the product of the creative process. The compromise begins with
the Constitution. Congressional power to act with respect to copyright (and patent)
is derived directly from Article I of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have
Power... To promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 15
Thus, the power is granted to create the copyright monopoly, but "for limited
Times," and for a limited purpose-promotion of "the progress of Science and useful
131d. at 2-4.
14 Id. at 21; see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283,285 (1996):
Digital technology threatens to upend copyright's already uneasy accommodation of public access
with private ownership. Once a cteative work is freely available online, anyone can, with a few
clicks of a mouse, make perfect digital copies and limitless digital variations, and can electronically
distribute them to the ends of the earth.
15 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
[Vol. 62:569
DIGITAL THREAT TO COPYRIGHT L4 W
Arts." The compromise continued with congressional implementation of the power
by specific enumeration of the bundle of rights held by a copyright owner,16 an
enumeration that, by its very nature both grants an array of specific rights and, by
implication, excludes other rights:
Copyright law stries a precarious balance. To encourage authors to create and
disseminate original expression, it accords them a bundle of proprietary rights in their
works. But to promote public education and creative exchange, it invites audiences and
subsequent authors to use existing works in every conceivable one that falls outside the
province of the copyright owner's exclusive rights. Copyright law's perennial dilenmma
is to determine where exclusive rights should end and unrestrained public access shouldbegin. 17
Compromise and balance pervades the Copyright Act; it reflects a legislative
history characterized by a continuing balancing of strongly represented interests. 18
For example, section 109 of the Act19 codifies the "first sale" doctrine, an exception
to the copyright owner's exclusive right publicly to distribute a work,20 giving the
lawful owner of a copy of a copyrighted work the unlimited right to transfer or
otherwise dispose of that copy without the consent of the copyright owner. Under this
provision, lawful copies of copyrighted books, videotapes of copyrighted motion
pictures, and similar works may be sold, transferred, or rented. However, responding
to the concerns of the record industry and of publishers of computer software,
Congress amended that section to make the first sale doctrine inapplicable to the
commercial rental of records or computer software. 21 Similarly, as a general matter,
copyright protection does not extend to utilitarian works and industrial design.22 This
doctrine served to preclude protection for architectural works (as opposed to
architectural drawings and plans); but Congress, responding both to the need to
confom to the Bern Convention and to sharp criticism of the existing state of the law,
passed the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, which protects
architectural works, separating them from the general exclusion of utilitarian works.23
16 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
17 Netanel, supra note 14, at 285.
18 See generally Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELLL. REv. 857 (1987).
19 17 U.S.C § 109 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
210 § 106(3).
21 Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450,98 Stat. 1727 (1984) (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b).(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
22 See generally SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL., FUNDAMENTAlS OF UNrID STATES
INTEL.ECUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND TRADEMARK § 2.4.4 (1999).
23 Architechnal Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat 5133 (1990)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(8) (1994)) (adding "architectural works" to the
enumeration of "works of authorship?).
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While the process of continuing congressional compromise has been criticized
as being too responsive to the needs of specific and influential interest groups, 24 it is
also responsive to the continuing need to reexamine the law as conditions change. For
good or ill, this legislative give-and-take plays an important and continuing role in the
development of the law; it serves as a flexible tool and a tool for giving the law
flexibility. This rather pragmatic flexibility in the details of copyright law, however,
also makes it difficult to find moral imperatives in those details. The law, in essence,
says not "thou shalt not copy," but 'hou shalt not copy certain works, under certain
circumstances, which may change from time to time."
A. Congress, the Copyright Act, and Technology
Although congressional tinkering is a long-standing practice, the fundamental
copyright law was largely unchanged for a period of almost seventy years until the
major revision culminating in the Copyright Act of 1976.25 In that revision, Congress
attempted to create a comprehensive structure flexible enough to accommodate
technological change and cover virtually any kind of creative activity. Explicit
recognition of the need to deal with emerging technology was found only in
contemporaneous congressional creation of the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works whose task was to determine what if any,
special legislation was needed to deal with computer software.2 6 Ultimately, the
Commission's deliberations resulted in minimal recommendations, which Congress
adopted: the inclusion in the Act of a definition of a computer program,27 (the effect
of which was to qualify a computer program, if sufficiently original, for protection as
a "literary work")2 8 and special provisions relating to permissible copying.29 Apart
from these minor adjustments, it was assumed that the Act could cope with any
technological changes or any new technologies that may be developed in the future.
The unintended consequences that arise from the process of compromising
conflicting interests and the assumption that the existing law can accommodate
24 See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L.
REv. 275 (1989).
25 Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
26 National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Pub. L. No.
93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
27 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1998) (defining the computer program as "a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result").
28 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,1249 (3d Cir.
1983) (holding that "a computer program... is a 'literary work').
29 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1998) (providing a limited exception to the exclusive right of
copyright owners to control the copying of computer programs).
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technological change, are glaringly apparent in the congressional response to industry
concerns over the development of digital audio technology. While the music industry
had long railed against private audio taping of phonograph records, 30 that concern
was alleviated somewhat with the rapid displacement of phonograph records by CDs;
an analog audio tape of a digital CD could not approach the sound quality of the
original.31 However, the development of digital audio tape recorders, with the ability
to make virtually perfect copies with no degradation from generation to generation,
produced a reaction, perhaps verging on panic, that resulted in congressional passage
of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992.32 These provisions, essentially directed
at wholesale recording of copyrighted musical works, seek to prevent sequential
copying-the making of digital copies of digital copies of a digitally recorded work-
and impose royalty obligations on sales of recording equipment and tape. On the
assumption that these provisions would alleviate the serious problems, that Act
expressly immunizes from liability non-commercial digital or analog copying of
musical recordings. 33
In the event, whether because of or in spite of the Home Recording Act, there has
not developed an appreciable consumer market for digital audio taping in the United
States. The widespread digital copying through the use of the equipment described
by that Act and foreseen by the record industry did not occur. Rather, completely
different problems, arising out of an unanticipated technology, have produced results
far more serious for the music industry. Focusing on digital tape technology, neither
Congress nor the music industry was prepared for the distribution of music through
the Internet. Although the "uploading" of copyrighted music to an Internet website
is an infringing "distribution," 34 considerable controversy existed over whether the
immunities in the Home Recording Act extended to "downloading" by a consumer
or the copying of that downloaded material from a computer hard drive onto a CD or
other device. While there had been judicial language supporting the exemption,3 5 it
30 This concern was the basis for the amendments to the "first sale" provisions relating to
rental of records, discussed supra note 21 and accompanying text.
31 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073
(9th Cir. 1999) (Tor example, when an analog cassette copy of... a compact disc is itself copied
by analog technology, the resulting 'second-generation' copy of the original will most likely suffer
from the hiss and lack of clarity characteristic of older recordings").
32 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
33 § 1008.
34 See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, No. 0016401, No. 0016403,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
1941, at *1 (9th Cir. 2001).
35 See Diamond Multimedia, 180 F3d at 1079:
As the Senate Report explains "[t]he purpose of [the Act] is to ensure the right of consumers to
make analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for theirprivate, noncommercial
use"... The Act does so through its home taping exemption, see 17 U.S.C. § 1008, which
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has most recently been held that "the Audio Home Recording Act does not cover the
downloading of MP3 files to computer hard drives. 36
To rub salt into the wound created by these unintended consequences, it has been
held that an MP3 recorder or similar device designed to record from an individual's
computer is not the kind of equipment subject to the limitations and royalty provisions
of that Act.37 The immunities-the product of an attempt to deal comprehensively
with one perceived technological threat--together with the fact that it is now easy and
inexpensive to make perfect copies of CDs, have now produced the exact
phenomenon that Congress had thought it had avoided, the proliferation of perfect
sequential copies of copyrighted music without the payment of royalties.38 Neither
Congress nor the interested parties contemplated a "revolutionary new method of
music distribution made possible by digital recording and the Intemet;... the brave
new world of Intemet music distribution." 39
B. Playing Catch-Up: Escalating Technology Wars
One of the exacerbating problems related to the dissonance between legal
proscription and normative conduct is the use of technology to alter the ground rules.
Rather than rely simply on finding and prosecuting claims of copyright infringement,
the copyright owner attempts to find a way physically to prevent copying of the work
only to be confronted with further advances in technology designed to defeat the
protection scheme. This seemingly endless game of catch-up, as encryptors and
decoders leapfrog one another, takes place usually in a context in which there is a
large class of consumer-infringers (as well as consumers who are not infringers) who
either do not consider the copying involved to be an infringing act or do not believe
that the law ought to inhibit or punish their conduct. The matter is further complicated
by the fact that copyright owners of consumer-directed products generally do not
choose to use the cumbersome machinery of litigation against the individual
"protects all noncommercial copying by consumers of digital and analog musical recordings,"
H.R. Rep. 102-873(), at *59.
Id. (alterations in original).
36 Napster, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1941, at *50.
37 Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079 ("the Act seems designed to allow files to be
'laundered' bypassage through a computer").
38 In Diamond Multimedia, the court stated:
These technological advances have occurred, at least in part, to the traditional music
industry's disadvantage. By most accounts, the predominant use of MP3 [digital compression
technology used on the Internet] is the trafficdng in illicit audio recordings.... Various pirate
websites offer free downloads of copyrighted material, and a single pirate site on the Internet may
contain thousands of pirated audio computer files.
Id at 1074.
391d.
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consumers, but prefer to concentrate on those who provide the wherewithal for the
consumers to make their copies.
For example, in the early days of consumer software development it was quite
common to sell copy-protected software-software containing code that prevented
the user from making a usable copy of the software. The schemes were created to
prevent piracy, the unlawful copying of the software. Copy protection through such
encryption was overkill in that it also served to prevent lawful copying; nevertheless,
it served as a reasonably useful prophylactic. However, in short order software was
developed to unlock or otherwise evade the copy protection schemes. The creation
of such software was not itself an act of copyright infringement; liability, if any, in
connection with the sale of that software could take the form only of a claim for
contributory infingement. The fact that the evasive software could be used for
substantial noninfi'nging purposes, such as the making of a lawful archival copy by
the lawful owner of the original copy of the software, 40 served to defeat any
contributory infingement claim 41
Similarly, in order to prevent unlawful copying, producers of videotaped motion
pictures (and, more recently, DVDs) encode the tape or DVD to prevent making of
usable copies. In the case of videotape, this fortress almost immediately became
vulnerable; for a relatively low price, one could buy a "black box" which, when
connected between a playback and a recording VCR, would produce a clean copy of
the copyrighted motion picture. Again, while the individual making the copy would
be liable for infringement if pursued, the manufacturer and distributor of the "black
box" could be liable only if the standards for contributory infringement were met;
manufacturing and/or distributing the device to defeat the copy-protection system was
not itself actionable outside of the parameters of contributory infringement.
Digital technology has significantly enhanced the ability of copyright owners of
digital material to encrypt the material. Where the material is distributed digitally and
available through digital networks, such encryption can effectively not only prevent
copying in the traditional sense, but can serve effectively to limit access to the
material itself, even for otherwise lawful purposes. Obviously, the same digital
technology used to encrypt may also be used to de-encrypt, to decode and evade the
encryption scheme. One would expect, once again, to find technological leapfrogging
between the encryptors and the decoders.
Congress, however, has altered the balance with passage, in late 1998, of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).42 Among other provisions, that Act, in
bringing United States copyright law into harmony with the European Union,
specifically makes it actionable to "circumvent a technological measure that
40 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1998).
41 See, ag., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
42 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1998)).
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effectively controls access to a [copyright protected] work," or to "traffic in any
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof," that circumvents
technology that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work or otherwise protects
any rights of a copyright owner.43
The DMCA was the product of intense negotiations and compromise among
various interested groups. That compromise can be seen in a number of specific
exemptions for certain kinds of "circumvention" activities. Other activities are
proscribed even if access and/or copying would otherwise be permissible but for the
act of circumvention. The Act, both in its proscriptions and exemptions, responds
specifically to a variety of parochial concems. However, in that specificity may lie the
source of considerable difficulty in the future as present technology changes. Indeed,
in its specific response, both to the needs of copyright owners to use encryption
technology and to the concerns about the further use of de-encryption technology, the
DMCA may well serve further to widen the gap between widespread conduct and
legal precepts and thereby further to attenuate the normative role of copyright law.44
C. The Peculiar Problem of Visual Works
1. Generally
By the very nature of the legislative process, technology will always be ahead of
the law and it is a difficult task to craft a law, or for the courts to interpret the law,
fully to accommodate technological change. Consider some of the problems created
by technological change in applying traditional copyright doctrine to visual works.
To be constitutionally protected under the Copyright Act, a work must be the
"writing" of an "author." Beginning with the 1884 United States Supreme Court
opinion in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v. Sarony,45 holding that a
photographer may be an "author" whose photograph is a "writing," there has been a
consistent expansive interpretation of these terms. With the Supreme Court's defining
statement that "[a]n author... is '[one] to whom anything owes its origin,' ' 46 it has
readily been accepted that visual artists, sculptors, composers, photographers, and
other expressive creators using tools other than the written word, are "authors," whose
works, if appropriately fixed, are "writings" in the sense constitutionally required for
protection.47
43 § 1201(a)(1)(A); § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1). See generally HALPERN ET A., supra note
22, § 11.2.
44 Cf. DIGrrAlDILEMMA, supra note 1, at 221-23.
45 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (involving a photograph of Oscar Wilde).
4 6 Id. at 57-58.
47 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994):
Works of authorship include the following categories:
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For copyright protection to attach to a fixed "writing" it must be an "original
work of authorship." 48 The Supreme Court has made it clear that "[o]riginality
remains the sine qua non of copyright," a constitutional prerequisite to
copyrightability.4 9 "Originality" is a complex construct, embodying both the concept
of independent origin and a minimal level of creativity, a modest amount of
intellectual labor "Original... means only that the work was independently created
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least
some minimal degree of creativity."50 However, "the requisite level of creativity is
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice."5' In short, "[t]he least pretentious
picture" can meet the originality standard.52
Photography has been the source of doctrinal development and implementation
of the constitutional constructs of "writing," "author," and "originality." The recent
application of sophisticated digital technology to photography (and other visual
techniques) has created concern and confusion as to the applicability and limits of
what had been established doctrine. Sarony was decided in the early days of
photography, and the Court's opinion was informed by the then state of an art which
involved a high degree of skill (and effort) and creative decision making. "[T]he
particular portrait at issue in that case was sufficiently original-by virtue of its pose,
arrangement of accessories in the photograph, and lighting and the expression the
photographer evoked--4o be subject to copyright" 53 While the Sarony court
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
48 Id.
49 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,348 (1991).
50 Id. at 345. " he requirement of originality actually subsumes two separate conditions, i.e.,
the work must possess an independent origin and a minimal amount of creativity." Baltimore
Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players, 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986). "A work is original
if it is the independent creation of its author. A work is creative if it embodies some modest
amount of intellectual labor." Ia at 668 n.6.
51 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. In Atari Games v. Oman, the court reversed denial ofregistration
of a simple geometric "paddle" video game. 979 F.2d 242, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Judge (now
Justice) Ruth Bader Ginsburg emphasized how minimal the creativity standard is: "We are
mindful... of the teaching of Feist that '[t]he vast majority of works make the [copyright] grade
quite easily."' Id
52 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,250 (1903); cf. Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201,214 (1954) ("Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit
a narrow or rigid concept of art.").
53 The Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp2d 191,195 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
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expressly left open the doctrinal question whether "the ordinary production of a
photograph" invariably satisfies the originality requirement, the passage of time, along
with the enormous advances in photographic technology, essentially replaced analytic
dissection of a particular photograph with a categorical rule: all but the most
mechanical photographs contain sufficient originality and creativity for copyright
protection.54
The development of this doctrine antedated the nearly universal phenomenon of
auto-focus, auto-exposure, auto-wind photography. The result is the identical
treatment, for purposes of copyrightability, of the carefully framed and created
photograph and the impulse-driven, tossed off point-and-shoot image. Each will be
considered an "original work of authorship" entitled to full copyright protection. Can
this doctrinal democracy be justified as we move to fully digital image creation,
which, to a large extent, produces greater transparency between photographer and
subject-even greater than that provided by auto-focus, auto-exposure, auto-wind,
point-and-shoot photography?
The decision to grant the copyright monopoly indiscriminately in these
circumstance may require reconsideration of the long-standing doctrine of
"nondiscrimination." That doctrine recognizes the limits of judicial capability;, the
court is not the appropriate place to make aesthetic distinctions or judgments. As the
Supreme Court observed in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., "[it would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judge of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits."55 The aesthetic merit or societal worth of a work is
irrelevant to a determination of copyrightability. Simply stated, any "original work of
authorship" that is fixed in a tangible medium expression will receive copyright
protection. With two cases, straddling the end of the nineteenth century, the Court set
out the basis for an expansive and evenhanded approach to copyrightability;, an
approach that, theoretically, at least, is devoid of value judgment, and predicates the
grant of the copyright monopoly upon the most minimal standards compatible with
the constitutional mandate.
Certainly, the capability problem-the difficulty of making sound aesthetic
judgment-has, if anything, been intensified by the enormously increased output of
see also Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (SD.N.Y. 1968) (finding originality
in the photographer's decision as to the camera angle, lighting, the choice of film, exposure speeds,
focus, and variety of other factors that go into producing the finished product); Rogers v. Koons,
960 F2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Elements of originality... mayinclude posing the subjects,
lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired expression, and almost any other
variant involved.); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Rogers, 960 F.2d at 307).
54 See Brdgeman, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 196 (holding that there is broad scope for copyright in
photographs because "'a very modest expression of personality will constitute sufficient
originality"' (footnote omitted)).
55 188 U.S. 239,251 (1903).
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visual imagery. Nevertheless, with the enhanced potential for image creation,
manipulation, and dissemination provided by digital technology it may be necessary
to rethink the evenhanded nondiscriminatory and nonjudgmental approach to the
vesting of exclusive rights. The available digital tools today may be used equally for
the virtually mindless arranging and rearranging of pixels and for the truly creative
production of a visual image; the "creative" process may require little or no real effort.
While the Supreme Court has made clear that copyright is to be based upon some
minimal degree of intellectual creativity rather than effort, expense, or workmanlike
skill,56 the social cost of treating the resulting digital creations equally may well
exceed the cost of making informed aesthetic distinctions.
2. Creativity in Derivative Works
The Copyright Act vests exclusively in the copyright owner the right to create
derivative works.57 At the same time, the Act recognizes that a derivative work may
itself be copyrightable independently of the work upon which it is based.58
"Derivative work' is defined as "a work based upon one or more preexisting
works."59 Because "art reproduction" is specifically included in the Act's definition
of a derivative work,6° it follows both that reproduction of a copyrighted art work
without consent of the copyright owner is an act of infringement and that such
reproduction may itself be a copyrighted work to the extent of "the material
contributed by the author" of the reproduction. The use of digital technology to
reproduce or to transform visual works has resulted in the need to rethink the
conventional doctrine concerning both what is an infringing derivative work and what
kind of "contribution!' will be sufficient to give the creator of the reproduction or
transformation a copyright interest in the resulting work.
56 See generally Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
57 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994).
58 § 103:
(a) The subject matter of copyright... includes... derivative works....
(b) The copyright in a... derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the
author of such work, as distinguished from the pre-existing material employed in the work, and
does not imply any exclusive right in the pre-existing material.
59 § 101:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one more pre-existing works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording; art
reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which the work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or
other modifications which, as a whole, represented an original work of authorship, is a"derivative
work."
6 Id.
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a. Infringement by Creation ofDerivative Works
Vesting in the copyright owner of a work the exclusive right to create derivative
works appears to be a necessary corollary of the copyright monopoly. The
transformation of Shaw's Pygmalion from the stage to the screen, and the subsequent
further transformation into the stage musical My Fair Lady and then the motion
picture version of that musical, involved the serial creation of derivative works, each
building on the other and each requiring consent of the copyright owners of the
preceding works.
However, the derivative right may also be an invitation to confusion in the
creative process. Artistic, creative works are often the product of various influences,
direct and indirect, blatant and subtle. The exclusive right to prepare a derivative work
does not serve as an omnibus shield against any and all misappropriation; it protects
against the taking, through one or another form of transformation, of the creative
expression contained in the underlying work, as in, for example, the transformation
of a novel into a motion picture. To be an infringing derivative work, "the infringing
work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form" 61 The latter
work must incorporate, to some extent expressive material from the underlying work
While it is clear that copyright protects only the original expression of an idea
and not the idea itself,62 the determination of what, in any given work, is "expression!'
and what is "idea" is an extraordinarily subtle and complex task, in which the
standards and criteria exist only at the highest analytic level. If copyright protection
were limited only to the literal expression in a work, the task of determining
infringement would be relatively simple. The law, however, developed in a much
more expansive direction, making it clear that the copyright in a work extends beyond
literal expression to the sufficiently developed non-literal, structural aspects of the
work.63 "Two works need not be identical in order to be deemed 'substantially
similar' for purposes of copyright infringement.... Both literal and nonliteral
similarity may warrant a finding of copyright infringement."64 Where a taking
involves the nonliteral elements of a work, the line between evocation or use of ideas
61 H.R. REP No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 58 (1975); see also Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
manufacturer of "Game Genie," which allowed player to alter features of Nintendo's copyrighted
games, was not a derivative work).
62 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). See generally HALPERN ET AL, supra note 22, § 2.3.3.
63 This fundamental proposition was initially set out by Judge Learned Hand in two early
opinions that have set the analytic basis for determination of infringement: Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d. Cir. 1930); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d
49 (2d. Cir. 1936).
64 Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, n.25 (1 lth Cir. 1996); see also Twin Peaks
Prods. Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1993) ("substantial similarity can
take the form of 'fragmented literal similarity' or 'comprehensive nonliteral similarity") (citation
omitted).
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and copying of protected expression is by no means clear. In the case of works of
visual art, where one literally builds upon the work of another, it may often be a
difficult task to determine where "homage" ends and unlawful taking begins.
This problem, of course, is not new and arguments have been raised against the
application of derivative-works liability to transformative visual art.65 However, the
widespread and relatively inexpensive availability of digital image manipulation tools
adds a new and more complex dimension to that old problem. For example, one may
now easily create a digital copy of a work (by scanning, by downloading from the
Interet or by any of a large variety of techniques) and then, with image editing tools,
transform that image so radically that the final product on its face bears virtually no
resemblance to its source. The initial copying would be an infringing act if done
without consent 66 Would the digital transformation be an infringing derivative work
even if the original copying were done with consent? Given the wide availability of
digital images with respect to which the copyright owner has granted permission for
consumer, personal copying and use, the problem of digital transformation that
essentially consumes and transfigures the underlying work in the creation of the
derivative work is by no means academic.
The final product may certainly be artistic, aesthetically pleasing, and the result
of creative use of the available tools well beyond the simple appropriation of
another's work. The analytic models that have been developed in the law of copyright
with respect to derivative works generally do not contemplate the kind of
transformation now made possible through digital techniques, a consumptive
transformation by which the expressive elements of the underlying work are largely
unrecognizable. Nevertheless, the fact that the new work in fact physically
incorporates expressive elements of the old would appear to be sufficient to make it
an infringing derivative work.67 That may be a sound result in terms of policy, but if
so it should not be the product of the mindless application of doctrine developed in
a different technological milieu. Rather, we need serious discussion of how this
transformative technology has an impact upon our generally understood ideas of
65 For an extreme statement of the position, see, e.g., Louise Harmon, Law, Art, and the
Killing Jar, 79 IOWA L. REv. 367 (1994).
66 Even the "intermediate" copying of the original in the creation of a work that does not
ultimately contain the copyrighted material can be infringing. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518-19 (9th Cir. 1992).
67 See, .g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir.
1992):
A derivative work must incorporate a protected work in some concrete or permanent
"form."...
... The examples of derivative works provided by the [Copyright] Act all physically
incorporate the underlying work or works. The Act's legislative history similarly indicates that "the
infringing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form."
Id (citations omitted).
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"copying." Certainly, a work that borrows only the general ideas or general structural
themes of an earlier work to evoke the original would not be considered an infinging
derivative work. It is at least arguable that a work tha, while incorporating an earlier
work's expressive elements, so transforms them that they cannot readily be found in
the new work, is similarly an evocative work but not an infringing "derivative
work." 68
Of course, this example also has implications for the doctrine of fair use. The
general matter of fair use is outside the scope of this paper;, however, it may well be
that expanded fair use constructs can be applied to works that are the product of
digital manipulation to produce a workable result For example, the Ninth Circuit has
held:
[while] disassembly [of computer software] is wholesale copying that falls squarely
within the category of acts that are prohibited by the statute... where disassembly is the
only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted
computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access,
disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law.69
In language particularly relevant to the larger issue of the relationship between
technological exigencies and copyright doctrine, the court observed: "We are not
unaware of the fact that to those used to considering copyright issues in more
traditional contexts, our result may seem incongruous at first blush."70
From the infancy of copyright protection, [the fair use doctrine] has been thought
necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.". . . "[I]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few,
ifany, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout Every
68 It has been suggested that a new work cannot be considered an infringing derivative work
if it is not "substantially similar" to the underlying work See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d
1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984). However, in general, the "substantial similarity" test is used to
determine infringement in the absence of direct proof of copying, access and substantial similarity
together provide circumstantial evidence of copying. Where, as in the hypothetical situation posited
here, the copying, and physical incorporation is conceded, the relevance of a substantial similarity
inquiry is questionable.
69 Sega, 977 F.3d. at 1525, 1518, 1527-28. Sega was followed in Sony Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). Sega was expressly adopted
in Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1540 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996) ("We find the Sega
opinion persuasive in view of the principal purpose of copyight-the advancement of science and
the arts"). See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
('reverse engineering object code to discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair
use").
70 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527.
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book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much
which was well known and used before."7 1
As Benjamin Kaplan observed more than thirty years ago:
[l]fman has any "natural" ights, not the least mst be a right to imitate his fellows, and
thus to reap where he has not sown. Education, after all, proceeds from a kind of
mimicry, and "progress," if it is not entirely an illusion, depends on generous indulgence
of copying.72
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the concept of "transformative" use
lies at the heart of fair use analysis; that the greater the degree of creative
transformation of an underlying work, the more appropriate is the application of the
defense of fair use:
T]he goal of copyright to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the
creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use
doctrine's guarantee ofbreathing space within the confines of copyright ... and the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.73
Certainly, this language does not arise in the context of the wholesale
appropriation of the entirety of a copyrighted work, and it would strain the fair use
doctrine to immunize one who engages in such appropriation simply by reframing the
work of another or transforming it into another medium.74 However, the fair use
doctrine does need to accommodate the creative transformative possibilities that
digital technology affords. Such accommodations can perhaps provide a greater
degree of synchrony between behavior and the law.
To that end, it is perhaps necessary to shift the focus of "copying" analysis from
the process by which a transformative work is created to the end product itself. While
such a shift may be actuated by the fact that a great many people have both lawful
access to large libraries of works of visual art in digital format and highly
sophisticated tools for manipulating those images, there is a more compelling need
for reconsideration. The law of copyright, if it is to have normative force, must also
recognize and foster the creative potential arising from that technology. This is
essential if the law indeed is to serve the broad purpose behind the constitutional
copyright grant.
71 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (second alteration in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I § 8, cl. 8; Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas.
615,619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Story, J.)).
7 2 BNAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1967).
73 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
74 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,310 (2d Cir. 1992).
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The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but "to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts."... To this end, copyright assures authors the
right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by a work 75
The Digital Dilemma76 suggests, more broadly-
[E]xploring whether or not the notion of copying is an appropriate foundation for
copyright law, and whether a new foundation can be constructed for copyright based on
the goal set forth in the Constitution... and a tactic by which is achieved, namely,
providing incentive to authors and publishers. In this framework, the question would not
be whether a copy had been made, but whether a use of a work was consistent with the
goal and tactic.7 7
It is in this context that the complex doctrine of fair use may best be used both
to shelter the creative transformative work that may use, but not exploit an underlying
work while protecting the creators of copyrighted material from unfair, exploitative
appropriation.
b. Originality in Derivative Works: Digital Reproductions
As noted above, a derivative work that is itself non-infringing 78 will be
copyrightable to the extent of "the material contributed by the author" of the work
So, too, the Copyright Act expressly contemplates that a reproduction of a work of
art may qualify as an independently copyrightable derivative work, again, to the
extent of the material contributed by the creator of the reproduction. 79 That
contribution, as with any of the material for which copyright protection is sought
must meet the minimal standard of originality (i.e., independent in origin and have
some minimal "creativity"). The courts have struggled with the question of what
quantum of originality is necessary for a derivative work to be protected. The matter
is far from trivial:
The requirement of originality is significant chiefly in connection with derivative works,
where if interpreted too liberally it would paradoxically inhibit rather than promote the
75 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349-350 (1991) (quoting
from Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
76 DIGrrAL DuLEMMA, supra note 1.
77 Id. at 232.
78 The derivative work maybe non-infinging because it was createdwith the consentofthe
copyright owner of the underlying work, or because the underlying work is in the public domain,
or because the derivative work is considered a fair use of the underlying material.
79 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1998).
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creation of such works by giving the first creator a considerable power to interfere with
the creation of subsequent derivative works from the same underlying work.
80
Consequently, more is required in the case of derivative works than other works
to meet the low originality threshold.81
The "originality" question is fairly easily resolved with respect to certain kinds
of derivative works. For example, one may easily distinguish the original creative
components that go into creating a musical version of a play from the original
expression contained in the play itself and thus find the derivative work (the musical)
copyrightable to the extent of that added creative material. The matter becomes far
more complicated when trying to determine whether a reproduction of a visual work
contains sufficient added originality to be a copyrightable derivative work. These
complications are seen in a series of opinions by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit the court generally considered to be the premier copyright
tribunal in the United States. In 1951, inAlfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
Inc.,82 the court held that mezzotint reproductions of public domain off paintings were
copyrightable derivative works, so that one who copied these reproductions without
consent was held to be an infringer. 83 The standard for copyrightability of the
reproduction was that there be a "distinguishable variation" from the original.
Referring to the differences, the court observed:
[E]ven if their substantial departures from the paintings were inadvertent, the copyrights
would be valid. The copyist's bad eyesight or defective musculature or a shock caused
by clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having hit upon
such a variation unintentionally, the "author" may adopt it as his and copyright it.
84
Subsequently, the Federal District Court, relying upon this precedent held that
a highly accurate small-scale reproduction of Rodin's Hand of God was a
copyrightable derivative work 85
Later cases, both in the Second Circuit and elsewhere, however, have made it
clear that for a reproduction to be considered a copyrightable derivative work there
80 Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that artist's
rendering of Dorothy from The Wizard of Oz was not an original derivative work copyrightable
under the Copyright Act).
81 See, e.g., Entm't Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211,
1218-19 (9th Cir. 1997) ("the copyright protection afforded to derivative works is more limited
than it is for original works of authorship").
82 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
83 Id at 104-05.
84 Id. at 105.
85 Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F.Supp. 265,267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ("[G]reat skill and
originality is called for when one seeks to produce a scale reduction of a great work with
exactitude.").
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must be substantial difference or more than a "trivial variation" between it and the
underlying work 86 In the leading case of L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,87 a sharply
divided Second Circuit observed:
We follow the school of cases... supporting the proposition that to support
copyright they must be at least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial variation
such as might occur in the translation to a different medium.
Nor can the requirement of originality be satisfied simply by the demonstration of
"physical skill" or "special training." A considerably higher degree of skill is required,
true artistic skill, to make the reproduction copyrightable. 88
The court went on to state:
Absent a genuine difference between the underlying work of art and the copy of it
for which protection is sought, the public interest in promoting progress in the arts-
indeed, the constitutional demand... could hardly be served. To extend copyrightability
to minuscule variations would simply put a weapon for harassment in the hands of
mischievous copiers intent on appropriating and monopolizing public domain work.89
The court attempted to distinguish its earlier and more expansive holding in
Alfred Bell.90 However, later opinions,91 and the Supreme Court's strong rejection,
in Feist, of effort alone, or "sweat of the brow," as a substitute for originality,92 have
effectively isolated, if not overruled that earlier approach to copyrightability of
derivative works.
The matter was most recently and dramatically dealt with in The Bridgeman Art
Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corporation.93 Bridgeman claimed to have acquired the
exclusive rights in photographic transparencies, and digital transformations thereof,
86 Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300,305 (7th Cir. 1983); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d 905,909 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that plastic reproductions of Disney figures were
not copyrightable); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F2d 486,490 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding
copyright of mechanical toy banks invalid for lack of any substantial variation from the original);
Heam v. Meyer, 664 F.Supp. 832, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that reproductions of illustrations
by an author were not original, and thus not copyrightable).
87 536 F.2d at 486.
88 Id at 491.
89 Id at 492.
90 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
91 In the Second Circuit, see Durham Industies, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.
1980), Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F.Supp.2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
('Bridgeman I?'), and Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F.Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). See also Gracen v.
Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
92 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Royal Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 340,352-60 (1991).
93 Bridgeman 1, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
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of well known works of art located in museums around the world; presumably, these
rights were acquired from the museums and/or the photographers who created the
transparencies, and the Copyright Office had issued to Bridgeman a certificate of
registration for the reproductions as derivative works.94 Bridgeman alleged that Corel
had infringed Bridgeman's copyright in 120 reproductions by distributing digital
copies thereof without consent9s The federal district court held (i) the fact that the
Copyright Act expressly refers to "art reproduction" as an example of a derivative
work does not obviate the need for meeting the "originality" test as a prerequisite to
copyrightability, and (i) these high-quality photographic reproductions of public
domain paintings, as virtually exact, "slavish" copies of the underlying works, do not
possess the minimal originality to qualify as copyrightable derivative works: 96
In this case, plaintiffby its own admission has labored to create "slavish copies" ofpublic
domain works of art While it may be assumed that this required both skill and effort,
there was no spark of originality-indeed, the point of the exercise was to reproduce the
underlying works with absolute fidelity. Copyright is not available in these
circumstances. 97
As discussed above, and as the Bridgeman court acknowledged, "there is little
doubt that many photographs, probably the overwhelming majority, reflect at least the
modest amount of originality required for copyright protection."9 8 The Bidgeman
case represents the collision between the efficient categorical doctrine holding
essentially all photographs copyrightable irrespective of their subject matter or the
circumstances of their creation and the originality requirement as applied to derivative
works. It has heretofore generally been understood that the physical and technological
limitations in reproducing a work of art are such that one may approximate, but not
actually duplicate the original. These limitations inevitably leave room for the
"substantial variation" justifying including "art reproduction" in the category of
derivative works. In a context in which duplication, as opposed to approximation, was
a technologically difficult task, it was not necessary for the Copyright Act, in
providing examples of derivative wbrks, to encase the phrase "art reproduction" in
a limitative cocoon.
94 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 423-24 (SD.N.Y. 1998)
(Bridgeman I).
95 Id at 424.
96 Bridgeman H, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 197. In its earlier opinion, Bridgeman 1, 25 F. Supp. 2d
at 421, the court had reached the same conclusion applying the law of the United Kingdom. Id at
426. On reconsideration, in Bridgeman If, the court determined that the law of the United States
as to "originality" governed. 36 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
97 Bridgeman , 36 F. Supp. at 197.
98 Id at 196.
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With a technology that facilitates both very close duplication and the worldwide
dissemination of duplicated images, the conflict presented by the Bridgeman opinion
can have quite serious repercussions. Is the "substantial variation" test workable in
the context of relatively inexpensive high fidelity digital reproduction of public
domain works of art? Certainly, there is a possible threat to the public domain by
categorically protecting a photograph whose only function is to duplicate the public
domain work. Nevertheless, there is also a social cost to putting at risk one who uses
leading-edge technology accurately to duplicate and to disseminate to a broad public
important works otherwise accessible only to very few. The issues, and conflicting
needs, are more subtle, and have more ramifications for society, than would appear
from simple doctrinal analysis.
Ill. DoEs ONE Sz Frr ALL?
Much of the preceding discussion could be refrained in terms of the tensions
created by attempting to apply, to significantly diverse works, a unitary legal construct
whose precepts are purportedly universally applicable. That is, we have a single
Copyright Act that purports to apply equally across media, technological, and other
boundaries, to any and all "original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium
of expression."99 The nondiscrimination doctrine, discussed above, is a corollary of
that unitary construct The universal, as opposed to a particularistic, approach to
copyright binds together, under one set of standards, works of fiction and fact, poetry
and prose, art and architecture, drama and dance, sculpture and software;
commonality is found only at the fundamental level of original authorship and
fixation.
This framework does not accommodate a society in which differing codes of
conduct might apply to different kinds of works. In our daily lives, as well as in our
commercial lives, we do not really treat books the same way we treat computer
software, even though both are "literary works" for purposes of the Copyright Act;100
nor do we treat the seemingly ephemeral digital reproductions of musical or artistic
works that may appear on our computer screens the same way we treat their more
tangible embodiments. While the courts purportedly refrain, we continually make
aesthetic judgments and we apply quite different standards in the way we treat works
of fine art, television commercials, and photographs. These different standards
undoubtedly affect our sense of what is appropriate behavior in dealing with the
differeht products of the creative process. Someone who would, at the very least, feel
pangs of guilt in taking paragraphs of material from another's work, might feel much
less constrained in "sampling" parts of a musical work. Should our law take these
differences into account? Perhaps it would be more appropriate to ask if our legal
99 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
l00See § 101.
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system is capable of taking these differences into account without sacrificing
predictability and a modicum of efficiency.
Certainly, the law as it exists is not nearly as unitary as it purports to be. For
example, as noted above, "architectural works" are protected notwithstanding the
general principle against protection of utilitarian works, but the protection is not quite
as extensive as that afforded to other works.10 1 So too, the rights of the owner of
copyright in a sound recording are far more limited than those of the copyright owner
of the music contained in the recording.10 2 In fact, the Copyright Act is liberally
salted with special exceptions for particular kinds of works of authorship. Different
classes of work may well merit different treatment, with perhaps differing scope of
protection and differing definitions of infringing activity. Such particularistic
treatment may be most appropriate in the application of the judge-made concept of
fair use, recognizing that more latitude is required for certain kind of works than for
others. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that "some works are closer to the
core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence that fair use
is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied."'10 3
Moreover, there may be other avenues of intervention to enhance the normative
function of the law. Areas to explore here might include the peculiar matter of
personal/private use of copyrighted material, the use of compulsory licenses, and the
role of mass licensing organizations.
A. Personal/Private Use
There is a general misconception that there really is not anything wrong, legally
or morally, with copying for purely personal (as opposed to commercial) use.104 As
the Digital Dilemma notes: "This viewpoint is difficult to support on either legal or
ethical grounds. It is important to find ways to convince the public to consider
thoughtfully the legality, ethics, and economic implications of their acts of private
copying:' '105
[I]ndividuals find themselves capable of reproducing vast amounts of information, in
private, using commonplace, privately owned equipment A single individual can now
do in private what once would have required substantial commercial equipment and
101 See, e.g., § 120(a):
The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not include the right to
prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other
pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is located in
or ordinarily visible from a public place.
102 § 114.
103 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,586 (1994).
104 See DIGrrALDnEMMA, supra note 1, at 214, and supra text accompanying note 12.
105 DIGrrAL DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 214.
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perhaps criminal intent One important consequence is that copyright law is becoming
more concerned with regulating private behavior of individuals.
Traditionally, copyright has concerned public actions with public consequences,
such as public performance, public display, and dissemination of copies (an inherently
public act), and has focused on actions of organizations or individuals (like pirates)
whose actions have large-scale public consequences. But with computer and
communication equipment becoming commonplace in the home, the potential impact of
the private behavior of individuals has grown, and so correspondingly has interest in
regulating that behavior.10 6
The Copyright Act does not provide broad exemption for private, noncommercial
copying, although it does contain a number of very specific exemptions related to
private taking of copyrighted material.10 7 Particularly in the cultural context of digital
copying, manipulation, and wholesale distribution, it is too easy to look at "private"
copying as "harrless," if not permissible;1 0 8 -the view is too prevalent that private
use copying is virtually always fair use and... is often invoked to mask activities that,
in the plain light of day cannot be justified."10 9 In fact and in many cases the impact
of such copying is a market displacement, as the recipient of the copy receives free
that which would otherwise be subject to payment of royalties to the copyright
owner.
110
Nevertheless, it is worth exploring whether private use copying has differing
impact on different kinds of works and whether, irrespective of case-by-case fair use
analysis, the "bundle of rights," the components of the copyright for certain types of
works might exclude the purely private taking.111 Of course, there is the danger of
overspecification in defining certain works of authorship differently from others, but
106 Id at46.
107 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 33.
108 DIGrrALDLEMMA, supra note 1, at 124:
[M]isconceptions [about private copying] concern print, graphics, or other visual content.
Some of these are that if the purveyor of the illegal copies is not charging for them or
otherwise maling a profit, the copying is not an infringement; that anything posted on the
Web or on a Usenet newsgroup must be in the public domain by virtue of its presence there;
that the First Amendment and fair use doctrine allow copying of virtually any content so
long as it is for personal use in a home, rather than redistribution to others; that anything
received via email can be freely copied and that if the uploading, posting, downloading, or
copying does not, in the view of the end-user, hurt anybody or is just good free advertising,
then it is permissible.
109 Id at 135-36.
110Se generally Chapter 4, Individual Behavior, Private Use andFair Use, and the System
for Copyright, in DIGrrAL DILEMMA, supra note 1.
I 1 The very definition of the rights attaching to a given work of authorship maybe lirnited-
just as the distribution, performance, and display rights are limited to "public" activities.
17 U.S.C. § 106(3), (4), & (5) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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as we have enough experience with digital technology it maybecome easier to define
and determine those kinds of works for which a more flexible copyright structure
could harmonize the realities of the marketplace with the legitimate needs of the
copyright owners.
B. Compulsory Licensing
One of the significant mediating devices of the Copyright Act is the compulsory
license. The compulsory license device, where it applies, is the product of a
congressional determination that the principal value of a certain use is economic and
that the copyright owner should be satisfied with a fixed compensation for that use.
Essentially, with a compulsory license the copyright owner, for a fee, involuntarily
relinquishes the right to determine who may exercise certain ofthe owner's exclusive
rights. In exchange for appropriate payment, the copyright owner will be precluded
from enforcing the right to exclude and will be deemed to have granted a license to
the user.112
Prior to passage of the 1976 Act, there was only one significant compulsory
license, that "for making and distributing phonorecords."'' 13 The 1976 Act
significantly expanded the use of compulsory licenses, an expansion that continued
with the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 114 The newer compulsory licenses
contemplate industry-wide negotiation leading to the development of appropriate
license rates, rather than rates fixed by Congress.
A widely publicized compulsory license scheme would appear to be particularly
appropriate for digital images created for general public distribution by owners of
digital libraries. 115 Moreover, such a compulsory license arrangement could also
cover the right to manipulate images and create derivative works in the same medium.
With the certainty of cost and certainty of legality created by the compulsory license
mechanism, there is a reasonable possibility that a significant reduction in "piracy"
would accompany the setting of reasonable and affordable license rates. Ideally, such
an approach would also foster creativity and the development of better digital imaging
techniques, much the way the original compulsory license for phonograph recording
was the foundation for the growth of a vibrant recording industry.116
112 See generally HALPERN Er AL, supra note 22, § 6.1.2.
113 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994).
114 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1998)).
115 The economic trade-off between payment of a set fee and relinquishment of the right to
exclude would not seem to be applicable to the case of the individual creator of a visual work not
designed for mass distribution.
116 See HALPERN ET AL., supra note 22, § 6.1.2.6.
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C. Cooperative Rights Licensing Organizations
Along with the growth of the compulsory licensing device, has been increased
interest in cooperative licensing organizations. The paradigm was set by the major
music performance rights organizations, the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). These
organizations are designed to enforce the exclusive right of the copyright owner of a
musical work publicly to perform that work.117 Quite apart from the difficulty of any
copyright owner tracking live performances of copyrighted works, the vast
proliferation of broadcast recorded music makes individual enforcement of
performance rights a virtual impossibility. Moreover, there is certainly no general
societal consensus as to the desirability of the copyright owner's performance right.
Indeed, the right is almost counterintuitive, as one in lawful possession of, for
example, a music CD would feel entitled publicly to play that CD notwithstanding
a law that make such act infringing.
Nevertheless, collective action, through blanket licenses issued and enforced by
ASCAP and BMI, has proven quite successful in generating significant revenues to
copyright owners, without hindering the virtually uninterrupted stream of publicly
performed music. In this instance, vigorous enforcement, coupled with blanket
licenses at affordable fees providing certainty and predictability to the licensee, have
proved sufficient to overcome strong public antipathy and resistance to the right being
enforced. Similar collective action, in the form ofthe Copyright Clearance Center, has
been effective in limiting unauthorized copying of material from journals, while
encouraging limited copying and use of the material for research and similar
purposes. 118
This model of collective action, with broadly based licenses and reasonable rates
may well be appropriate for the licensing of rights to widely distributed digital
images. It is perhaps a bit early to identify the appropriate stakeholders, but with
further development of widely available digital technology that problem should be
117 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994). ASCAP, the first and still largest of the performing rights
societies, is essentially a licensing, collection, and distribution body. Its members-composers,
authors, and publishers of copyrighted musical works-assign to the society the non-exclusive
right to license the small performance rights (the nondramatic musical performance rights) to their
works collectively. With the license from the individual members, the society then negotiates
blanket licenses with broadcast stations, restaurants, bars, health clubs, and any other entities
desiring to perform any of the works. In exchange for payment of the annual fee, the licensee then
may exercise the nondramatic musical rights attaching to any and all of the society's works. The
accumulated license fees, after expenses, are then distributed to the members more or less on the
basis of the frequency of performance of their works, as determined by statistical samples. See
generally Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and Peforming
Rights Societies, 33 J. CoPYUGI-rr Soc. U.S.A. 332 (1986).
118 See generally Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. I (SD.N.Y. 1992),
aft'd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
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easily resolved. This approach, of course, changes neither societal perception of right
and wrong nor the normative position of applicable copyright law. Rather, it seeks to
make compliance easier and more affordable than it currently is by means of a model
that encourages broad public dissemination of creative works.
IV. MALUMINSE, MALUMPROHL BT, AND COMPROMISE
This essay began with an attempt to find and define the normative role of
copyright law in the face of the pressures of advanced digital technology, pressures
such that the law, even when understood, is often ignored. The task is complicated
by the fact that there is widely divergent thinking as to the proper role of copyright in
society. As one scholar wrote:
Hostility to copyright has a long and honorable history...
... [O]ne need climb no fences to make copies of intellectual products. The
restraints are obviously artificial, making the state's hand visible in a way a physical
barrier does not One knows that one is doing something wrong when one tries to sneak
into a neighbor's house or pick the lock of another's automobile; it may not seem so
obviously wrong to tape a musical recording or duplicate a computer program that is
already in hand. In addition, an act of copying seems to harm no one. There is no
perceptible loss, no shattered lock or broken fencepost; no blood, not even a
psychological sensation of trespass. As a result of all these factors, ordinary citizens may
perceive a copyright owner's intangible interest as imposing an "extra" restriction,
limiting their liberty in a way that ordinary property does not
[There] seems to be the perception, whether spoken or unspoken, that intellectual
property is somehow a "sport;" the statutory exception to the common law pattern,
imposing unique restraints on liberty. 119
There is a significant corpus of legal scholarship devoted to the pursuit of
justification-or lack ofjustification-for copyright itself.120 This work is a serious
and important contribution to understanding the foundations of our copyright system.
Discussion of the purpose and function of copyright law may guide and inform
constructive action. On the other hand, there is little to be learned from polemical
debate over whether copyright is a "good" or "bad" institution. Unfortunately, in
recent years there has been much gross oversimplification, in which copyright
119 Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1344, 1346-47
(1989).
120 For a particularly comprehensive, thoughtful, and provocative discussion, see Gordon,
supra note 119, and Neil WeinstockNetanel, Copyright anda Democratic Civ Society, 106 YALE
LJ. 283 (1996).
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proprietors are demonized and users (authorized or unauthorized) of copyrighted
material sanctified. This is done generally in the interest of unstated premises bearing
little relation to the reality of copyright and to the fact that the copyright construct is,
after more than two hundred years, a fundamental part of the American legal system.
That reality, born of both principle and compromise, defies such simplification.
Meaningful discussion of accommodation of this complex law to technological
exigencies and human behavior must be approached with an open mind, seriously,
but without solemnity or stultifying preconceptions.
As we seek a normative approach to copyright we must be aware of the
pressures of globalization and the need for harmonization. It is no longer possible for
American law to operate in isolation or disregard of intellectual property laws of the
rest of the world and it is therefore no longer sensible to make grand moral
pronouncements as to the idiosyncrasies of American law.
American culture, particularly academic culture, has a strong strain of antipathy
to copyright ownership-or at least to the rights attendant to such ownership;
European culture, at least as embodied in the activities ofthe European Union, is far
more protective of both the economic and personal rights of copyright owners. Thus,
while there has been long-standing dispute and struggle over the place of industrial
design in American law, the European Community has long provided it sui generis
protection. Similarly, while Congress and a variety of special interest groups continue
to debate the matter, the European Union has issued and implemented a directive
creating special protection for databases. So too, the intricately complex fair use
doctrine is largely a uniquely American judicial creation.
In general, the European and American approaches to intellectual property and
related matters are the products of strikingly different cultural and societal forces.
That is not to say that the general public in the European Union operate with greater
moral constraints with respect to copyright than does the American public. There are,
indeed, comparatively few universally accepted moral precepts related to copyright
Perhaps in this area pragmatism and politics must trump principle.
Certainly, to the extent that copyright law is unnecessarily complex, vigorous
commitment to public education as to what is and what is not permissible under the
law would be helpful. In The Digital Dilemma,12 1 the Committee on Intellectual
Property Rights and the Emerging Information Infrastructure concludes that:
Conclusion: A better understanding of the basic principles of copyright law would lead
to great respect for this law and greater willingness to abide by it, as well as produce a
more informed public better able to engage in discussions about intellectual property and
public policy.
121 DIGUTALDEMMA supra note 1.
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Recommendation: An educational program should be undertaken that emphasizes the
benefits that copyright law provides to all parties. Such a copyright education program
needs to be planned and executed with care. 122
Education, however valuable, does little with respect to conscious disregard of
or disrespect for the law, particularly the disregard that is fostered by a technology that
makes infringing activity so easy and painless as to leave no mark on the conscience.
Much of the conduct that we would call infringing, both in the past and in the context
of digital technology, most people would consider "wrong," malum in se; other
conduct, that the law would consider infringing, would be shrugged off by many,
perhaps with a wink, as merely malumprohibitum, "yeah, you're breaking the law,
but how big a law is it?" 123 In between is what might perhaps be called a moral
swamp, an area of uncertainty. It is in that context that the much maligned access,
circumvention, and copying restrictions of the DMCA may serve a useful purpose.
The danger, of course, as discussed above, is that of both overspecification-and the
risk of legal constraints being overtaken and made irrelevant by further technological
change-and overprotection, with concomitant limitation upon otherwise perfectly
lawful and harmless activity and diminution of the public domain as a source of
further creativity.
Ultimately, any normative role for copyright law must be as complex and
contradictory as the law itself. The digital technology of recent years has significantly
upset what was always a precarious balance and it is likely that further refinements
to that technology will give rise to even more serious disruption. There is no simple
set of "ought" and "ought not" to match the legal precepts of "shalr' and "shall not."
I have suggested a few areas of intervention that might serve to narrow, if not bridge
the gap between legal precepts and behavior. To some extent, there need to be areas
that are malum prohibitum while not malum in se in order to foster those creative
activities consistent with the overall constitutional purpose of copyright law, to some
extent there needs to be greater flexibility in the law to foster those creative activities
that would otherwise be hampered by the threat of infringement claims. This rather
messy, complicated, and compromise-laden schema mirrors our rather messy,
complicated, and compromise-laden world, and perhaps that is as it should be.
122 Id at 217.
123 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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